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COMMENT
BAD FAITH:
LIMITING INSURERS' EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN TEXAS
by Kelly H. Thompson

HE

competing considerations of promptly paying legitimate claims

and protecting policyholder premium dollars from fraudulent claims
impose a tremendous tension upon insurance companies.' Texas
courts currently are debating the duties owed and the extent of the insurers'
liability under these and other situations. Two major concerns are at the
heart of these debates. First, whether an insurance company should be liable
to its insured for damages beyond those specified in the insurance contract.
Second, whether such extra-contractual liability should extend to third parties who did not contract with the insurer.
This Comment analyzes the issue of insurers' extra-contractual liability in
the first and third party context in four steps. First, the article presents a
general introduction explaining the development of extra-contractual liability. With this general background as a basis, section two discusses the development and current state of law in Texas on insurers' extra-contractual
liability. Third, since California pioneered the development of insurers' extra-contractual liability, this Comment briefly illustrates that state's contrasting view. Finally, section four reviews the public policy considerations
both favoring and opposing the award of extra-contractual damages in Texas
breach of insurance contract cases. Given these considerations, the Comment concludes that: (1) no cause of action for damages beyond policy limits should exist for an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay first party insurance
claims; and (2) courts should not expand a direct cause of action for extracontractual liability to claimants in the third party context.
I.

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF INSURERS'
EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

Traditionally, the insurance policy itself has limited insureds' recoveries
1. Ryan, The Bad Faith Blast, FOR

THE DEF.,

Mar. 1986, at 20, 20.
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for claims brought under the contract provisions. 2 This concept of limited3
recovery emerged from the landmark damages case of Hadley v. Baxendale.
The concept follows the general rule that in breach of contract actions the
court should not put the injured party in a better position than he would
have been in had the parties performed the contract. 4 The theory developed
from Hadley that a court may limit an action for breach of an insurance
contract to the amount specified in the policy. 5 The limits specified in the
policy represent the only foreseeable 6damages that the parties envisioned at
the time they executed the contract.
Not satisfied with the foreseeability guidelines of Hadley, American courts
developed creative theories for the imposition of extra-contractual liability
on insurance companies. 7 Extra-contractual damages include any recoveries
in excess of the policy benefits provided by an insurance contract as a result
of a loss. 8 The most creative theory for extra- contractual damages applies a
new tort, commonly referred to as "bad faith," within the context of a contract action. 9 Courts refer to this new tort as a "duty of good faith and fair
dealing." 10
Bad faith implies something more than mere negligence, errors in judgment, bad manners, or breakdowns in communications.II The courts have
defined bad faith as an intentional tort in which the insurer, knowingly or
with reckless disregard, lacks a reasonable basis for denying policy proceeds. 12 The types of losses that are particularly vulnerable to bad faith allegations include: (1) questions of coverage; (2) questions of cause or origin of
damage; (3) substantial differences of opinion as to amounts, scope, or cost;
(4) adjustment problems, including the insured's unreasonableness and per2. Kornblum, An Introduction to the Principlesof Extra-Contractual Liability of Insurers, in BAD FAITH 1986, at 1.1 (1986).
3. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854); see Miller, Overview and Historical Development
of the Problem of Bad Faith and Punitive 'Damages 2 (Aug. 1979) (prepared for presentation
to Property Ins. Comm. of ABA, Dallas, Tex.).
4. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. Ch. 1854); Comment, Bad Faith
Refusal of Insurance Companies to Pay First Party Benefits-Time for the Illinois Supreme
Court to Recognize the Tort and Resulting PunitiveDamages, 1984 S. ILL. U.L. REV. 121, 121.
5. See Miller, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Id.
7. See Kornblum, supra note 2, at 1.1. For a discussion of the development in Texas
courts, see infra notes 76-114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development in
California courts, see infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
8. See Kornblum, supra note 2, at 1.3.
9. Although courts gloss over the name, commentators refer to the tort of "bad faith."
See Kornblum, supra note 2, at 1.23; Miller, supra note 3, at 2; Ryan, supra note 1, at 20;
Comment, supra note 4, at 124-26.
10. United States Auto Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974); Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973);
Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
11. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Whitaker, 687 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. Ct. App.

1985).
12. See Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759,
762 (1980) (Bad faith "imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliguity [sic], conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of
fraud."); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (1978) (court
applies objective test based on ordinary care to determine existence of bad faith).
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sonality conflicts between the insured and the adjuster; (5) policy violations;
and (6) long delays in adjustment. 13 California has pioneered the development of the bad faith tort and resulting extra-contractual liability in both
14
first party and third party situations.
The insurer's liability arises in first party cases out of coverages that the
insurer contracts to pay directly to the insured.' 5 The insurer and the insured constitute the sole parties to the dispute. 16 The cases typically arise
out of claims for damages caused by fire, accident, disability, or loss of life. 17
8
Policy benefits represent the contractual damages payable to the insured. '
Extra-contractual liability arises in third party cases when a third party
receives a verdict against an insured for an amount in excess of the available
limits of liability insurance, or when the insurer otherwise mishandles a third
party claim. 19 When the insured is unable to pay the judgment, the third
party or the insured sues the insurance company for the judgment in excess
of the insurance policy limits. 20 The basis of this action is the insurer's bad
faith refusal to settle with the third party within the insured's policy limits. 2I
In addition to the case law development of extra-contractual damages,
state legislatures have statutorily imposed extra-contractual penalties in the
form of treble damages in both the first and third party context. 22 Given
these various common law and statutory remedies, Texas courts are presently struggling with the issue of the extent of insurers' liability to first and
third parties. An appropriate resolution of this issue requires a thorough
understanding of the development and current state of the law in Texas, as
well as a survey of the experience in a state such as California that has
greatly expanded the scope of insurers' extra-contractual liability.
II.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN TEXAS

The development of insurers' extra-contractual liability began in Texas in
the third party context. In the first party context Texas courts have historically refused to recognize extra-contractual theories of recovery and recognize only contract remedies. 2 3 The Texas Supreme Court, however, has
recently reevaluated this well-reasoned tradition. 24 In addition to the common law development, the Texas Legislature has maintained a steady devel13. Berg, Good Faith/BadFaith - FirstParty, D- 14-15 (Mar. 1984) (DRI Defense Practice
Seminar).
14. See infra notes 152-92 and accompanying text.
15. See Kornblum, supra note 2, at 1.4; Comment, supra note 4, at 121 n.2 (citing 16 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 877 (1979)).
16. See Comment, supra note 4, at 121 n.2.
17. Id.
18. See Kornblum, supra note 2, at 1.1.
19. See id. at 1.4; Comment, supra note 4, at 121 n.1 (citing 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682 (1979)).

20.
21.
22.
75 and
23.
24.

See Comment, supra note 4, at 121 n.l.
Id.
For a discussion of Texas legislative action exemplifying such penalties, see infra notes
130 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 88 and 104 and accompanying text.
Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
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opment in regulating the insurance industry. 25 This section discusses the
Texas case law and statutory development in both the third and first party
context.
A.
1.

Extra-ContractualLiability in the Third Party Context

Case Law Development

Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.,26 although over fifty
years old, remains the authoritative case in Texas explaining the duties of the
insurer in the third party context.2 7 The Stowers doctrine arises whenever a
third party claimant offers to settle a disputed claim within the policy limits,
and the insurer refuses the offer. 28 In refusing to settle with the claimant,
the insurer realizes that the policy limits restrict its liability in the event of a
judgment in excess of those limits. At the same time, however, the insured
prefers that the parties settle so that it avoids the risk of personal liability
opposing
resulting from a judgment in excess of the policy amount.2 9 These
30
interests result in a conflict that the Stowers doctrine governs.
According to the Stowers doctrine, the insured must prove that the insurer
was negligent in declining to settle with the claimant for a sum within policy
limits. 3' If successful, the insured may recover a judgment against the insurer in excess of such policy limits. 32 The Stowers court held that a court
must consider three elements in order to determine the negligence of an insurer in handling settlement negotiations: (1) the severity of the third
party's injuries as well as all the surrounding facts and circumstances; (2) the
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the original injury that the insurer could have gained through
the exercise of ordinary care; and (3) evidence of strict rules that the insurer
followed that indicated a desire not to make settlement offers. 33 The doc25. See infra notes 60-75, 112-51 and accompanying text.
26. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
27. See Knox, An Insurer's Duty to Defend: The Stowers Doctrine, 2 TEX. INS. L. REP.
65, 67 (1985).
28. Id. at 545; see Comment, An Insurer's Failure to Settle: Standing Under the Stowers
Doctrine, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 441, 442 (1982).
29. Comment, supra note 28, at 442.
30. Id.
31. 15 S.W.2d at 547; see Knox, supra note 27, at 65.
32. See Knox, supra note 27, at 65.
33. 15 S.W.2d at 548; see Knox, supra note 27, at 68. Since the Stowers decision, the
judiciary as well as commentators have suggested several additional factors to consider in determining the insurer's negligence in failing to accept an offer to settle. See Globe Indem. Co.
v. Gen-Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Knox, supra note 27, at 68; Comment, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 TEX. L. REV. 233, 238-39 (1960). In Globe Indem. the court listed six factors to
consider:
(A) An opportunity to settle during the course of investigation or trial.
(B) Failure to carry on negotiations to settle or make a counter offer after receipt
of an offer to settle. ...
(C) Failure to investigate all the facts necessary to protect properly the insured
against liability.
(D) Question of liability-if liability is clear, greater duty to settle may exist.
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trine establishes an objective standard that requires the insurer to exercise
the same ordinary care and prudence in the management of the insured's
business as he would in the management of his own business. 34 The basis of
this rule is the premise that policy provisions that give the insurer complete
control of the litigation, as a matter of law, carry with them a corresponding
35
duty and obligation.
Four cases have refined the Stowers doctrine. The first, Highway Insurance Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches,36 distinguished between the negligence standard that Texas courts follow and the alternative
good faith standard. 3 7 The negligence standard of Stowers constitutes a
much stricter standard than that of good faith, since an insurer acting in
38
good faith may violate the due care element of the negligence standard.
Although the negligence standard is much stricter than the good faith standard, the court in Highway held that even under the negligence standard the
insurer will not be liable merely because subsequent events proved that a
decision to reject the claimant's offer was wrong. 39 The second case, Jones v.
Highway Insurance Underwriters,4° confirmed that the claimant's offer to
settle must be unconditional before the Stowers doctrine will classify an insurer's rejection as a breach of a duty. 4 1 The third refinement, found in
Chancey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,42 held that the insurer's policy
right to investigate, negotiate, and settle imposes a duty on the insurer actually to negotiate, as well as to settle under the Stowers doctrine. 43 Finally, in
Hernandez v. Great American Insurance Co.,44 the Texas Supreme Court
abolished the prepayment rule 4 5 in favor of the judgment rule. 46 The insured now has a cause of action against the insurer on the day the excess
judgment becomes final. 47 The insured's ability to pay the judgment is ir(E) Element of good faith-whether insurer acts negligently, fraudulently, or in

bad faith....
(F) If there are conflicts in evidence which increase the uncertainty of the insured's defense to the injured party's claim, the possibility of the insurer being
held negligent increases.
459 S.W.2d at 208.
34. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 548.
35. Id. at 547.
36. 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. Id. at 927.
38. Id. at 927-28.
39. Id.
40. 253 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 1022. The Texas Supreme Court recently gave cause to doubt this requirement
in Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1987). See infra note 52
and accompanying text.
42. 336 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 764-65. For a current debate on the extent of this agency relationship, see infra
notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
44. 464 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1971).
45. See Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 86 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935, opinion adopted) (the insured must not only prove negligence, but also must pay the
judgment that is in excess of the policy amount before it can successfully bring a Stowers
action).
46. 464 S.W.2d at 93.
47. Id.
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a Stowers cause of
relevant. 48 Although Hernandez broadens the doctrine,
4 9
action remains unavailable to the third party claimant.
Recent decisions illustrate the fact that the Stowers doctrine remains a
major element in Texas insurance litigation. In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin 50 the Texas Supreme Court applied the Stowers doctrine
to uphold a jury's finding that the insurer acted negligently even though the
third party claimant's settlement offer was deficient. 51 In so holding, the
court expanded the doctrine by relegating the requirement of an unconditional settlement offer to an evidentiary point. 52 In addition, the majority
expanded the scope of the agency relationship between the insurer and the
insured. 53 As the insured's agent, the insurer's duty includes investigation,
defense, preparation, trial, and reasonable settlement attempts.

54

Applying

this expanded agency relationship, the court found sufficient evidence to sup55
port an award of exemplary damages.
A recent Fifth Circuit opinion interpreting Texas law extended an insurer's liability to include attorney's fees, as well as punitive damages, for the
insurer's failure to handle a third party claim as would a reasonably prudent
person by neglecting to settle the claim in a timely manner. 56 In support of
the award for attorney's fees, the court reasoned that the insurer proximately
caused the insured's expense by breaching its duty to resolve the third
party's claim without the requirement of a lawsuit between the third party
and the insured. 57 The court contrasted attorney's fees incurred by the insured in defense of the third party's suit to attorney's fees incurred as payment of costs of a lawsuit by the insured against the insurer. 58 The
justification for the award of attorney's fees in the first situation is that they
constituted some of the insured's foreseeable damages, and the insurer's
breach of its duty to settle within policy limits proximately caused such
48. Id.
49. Id. at 94. The Stowers cause of action is a tort of negligence designed to help the
insured, not a third party. The third party holder of the former judgment benefited from the
tort to the extent of the judgment above the insured's policy limits. Cook v. Superior Ins. Co.,
476 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Samford v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(insured was the injured party under the Stowers doctrine in suffering an excess jury verdictnot the third party); Comment, supra note 28, at 445 (no Texas court has allowed a third party
claimant a Stowers cause of action).
50. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
51. Id. at 660.
52. Id. The dissent, citing Jones v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 253 S.W.2d 1018, 1022
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), correctly interpreted the majority's statement as a misapplication of the Stowers doctrine. Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 662 (Gonzales, J.,
dissenting) (unconditional offer to settle is a necessary prerequisite in a Stowers case).
53. 723 S.W.2d at 659.
54. Id. In contrast, the dissent stated that the Stowers doctrine holds the insurer liable for
negligent failure to settle a claim within policy limits. Id. at 661-62 (Gonzales, J., dissenting)
(investigation, preparation of the defense, and trial are merely factors to consider in determining if the insurer negligently failed to settle).
55. Id. at 660.
56. Texoma AG-Prods., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 755 F.2d 445, 448-50
(5th Cir. 1985).
57. Id. at 450.
58. Id.
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2. Statutory Remedies
The basis of a common law Stowers cause of action is the insurer's negotiations with a third party claimant. The Stowers cause of action belongs to the
insured; the third party claimant may, however, possess an independent statutory cause of action against the insurer. A person aggrieved by an insurance company possesses three statutory sources of relief in Texas: (1) the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 60 (2) article 21.21 of the State Insurance
62
Code, 6 1 and (3) article 21.21-2, the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act.
Although each of these statutes awards some form of extra-contractual relief
to prevailing plaintiffs in the first party context, only article 21.21 is available
to third party claimants.
Article 21.21 specifies conduct that constitutes unfair competition and deceptive practices in the insurance iidustry. 63 Any person aggrieved by an
insurance company's violation of the prohibited acts or practices possesses a
private cause of action under the article. 64 The Texas Supreme Court has
recognized expressly that article 21.21 confers a cause of action under section 17.46(a) of the DTPA. 65 The significance of this determination exists
because
unlike the DTPA, article 21.21 does not require "consumer" status. 6 6 Article 21.21's definition of "person" denotes the only requirement
for standing to sue. 67 This distinction makes a suit under article 21.21 available to third party claimants for a DTPA
complaint when no such opportu68
nity exists directly under the DTPA.
Article 21.21 allows three causes of action. 69 The first cause of action
59. Id. (citing Donnelly v. Young, 471 S.W.2d 888, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)) (if foreseeable, parties may recover attorney's fees).
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
DTPA].
61. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1987) [hereinafter article 21.21].
62. Id. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1987) [hereinafter article 21.21-2].
63. Article 21.21, § 4. Statements misrepresenting the terms of an insurance policy are
within the definition of unfair competition and deceptive practices. Id. § 4(1).
64. Article 21.21, § 16(a).
65. Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 593 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1980); Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688, 691-92 (Tex. 1979).
66. See Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 593 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1980).
67. Article 21.21, § 2(a). The Act's definition of person includes "any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal
benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including
agents, brokers, adjusters and life insurance counselors." Id.
68. See Stagg, McCall & Witt, Bad Faith & Deceptive Trade PracticesAct Claims, in SUING, DEFENDING AND NEGOTIATING WITH INSURANCE COMPANIES-STATE BAR OF TEXAS

G-18 (1984).
69. Article 21.21, § 16. Id. § 16(a) provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages as a result of another's engaging
in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance
or in any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Commerce Code,
as amended, as an unlawful deceptive trade practice may maintain an action
against the person or persons engaging in such acts or practices.
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arises from any violation of the enumerated unfair and deceptive acts or
practices. 70 For example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a misrepresentation of an agent subjects the insurance company to liability under
article 21.21.71 The second cause of action under article 21.21 originates in
any violation of DTPA section 17.46, which declares unlawful false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance industry. 72 The third
cause of action under article 21.21 comes from any violation of the regulations that the State Board of Insurance has issued to expand and explain
article 21.21. 73 The most important of these Board regulations defines and

sets the standards for determining misrepresentation as a violation of article
to the third party in21.21, section 4.74 Extra-contractual relief available
75
cludes treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs.
B. Extra-ContractualLiability in the First Party Context
1. Case Law Development
The 1929 Stowers decision firmly established insurers' extra-contractual
liability in the third party context. Unlike the third party situation, however, case law on first party extra-contractual liability has been unpredictable. Historically, the most frequent common law causes of action that
76
insureds raised in the first party context included: (1) breach of contract,
(2) fraud, 77 (3) negligence,7 8 and (4) breach of a duty of good faith and fair
79
dealing.
Since the insurance policy constitutes a contract between the insurance
company and the insured, the traditional contract action, not surprisingly, is
See Longley & Maxwell, Suits Against Insurance Companies.: Analysis, Strategy & Pitfalls, in
SUING & DEFENDING UNDER THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT-STATE BAR OF

TEXAS D-! (1985).

70. Article 21.21, § 4 lists the following as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices: "(1) misrepresentations and false advertising of policy contracts;
(2) false information and advertising generally; (3) defamation; (4) boycott, coercion and intimidation; (5) false financial statements; (6) stock operations and advisory board contracts;
(7) unfair discrimination; and (8) rebates."
71. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, 577 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. 1979). Contra
American Ins. Cos. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ) (plaintiff cannot recover damages under article 21.21 for failure of insurance company to advise him
of all policy provisions). Following the American Ins. decision, however, the legislature added
DTPA § 17.46(b)(23), which provides that failure to disclose information is deceptive conduct.
Thus, since article 21.21 incorporates § 17.46, whether failure to furnish the policy or information about the policy to the insured violates article 21.21 remains an open issue. See article
21.21, § 16; Stagg, McCall & Witt, supra note 68, at G-20.
72. DTPA § 17.46(a). For a discussion of the limitation of this cause of action to pre-sale
conduct of the insurer, see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
73. Article 21.21, § 16(a).
74. State Bd. of Ins., Board Order 186663 (Dec. 3, 1971), repromulgated as Board Order
41060 (June 4, 1982); see Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-12.
75. Article 21.21, § 16(b).
76. See Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-24.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at D-19.
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a common law cause of action in the first party context. 80 In applying con-

tract law, the insured may recover only the amount specified by the contract
itself.8 ' Rules of contract construction, however, run against the insurance
company, and a court will construe ambiguous clauses in favor of the insured.8 2 If the insurer breaches the insurance contract, the plaintiff-insured
may recover compensatory damages and attorney's fees. 83 In the absence of

an independent tort, however, courts will not allow exemplary damages for
breach of contract. 84 This
rule applies even if the breach is malicious, inten85
tional, or unreasonable.

Fraud, the second common law cause of action, may clearly form a basis
for recovery by an insured against an insurance company.8 6 Unlike the tort
of fraud, the availability of the third cause of action, negligence, is presently
unclear. Although no Texas court has previously applied the third party
Stowers negligence standard 87 to property insurers in the first party context, 88 a recent Texas Supreme Court decision appears to adopt such a standard in conjunction with the fourth common law cause of action, breach of
89
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In Arnold v. National County Mutual Insurance Co.90 the Texas Supreme
Court applied the fourth cause of action: a tort action for breach of a duty
of good faith and fair dealing. 9 1 Analysis of the law distinguishes this tort
action from a contract action. The basis of such a distinction is the differ80. See American Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Redford, 337 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. Gross v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1965, no writ).
82. Jones v. American Economy Ins. Co., 672 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
no writ) (possibly meaning no limitation will apply in the policy).
83. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (Vernon 1986).
84. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981) (lessee's failure to
comply with implied covenant of prudent operation, no matter how oppressive, does not subject the lessee to punitive damages); Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903,
911-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit upon insurance contract furnishes no basis for punitive damages); McDonough v. Zamora, 338 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (punitive damages not allowed in action to enforce
"hot checks").
85. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981); A.L. Carter
Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 526, 168 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1943); K.W.S. Mfg. Co. v.
McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. See Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Tex. 1977); Boenker v.
American Title Co., 590 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
87. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved) (a liability insurer is held to an objective standard of ordinary
care and prudence, and a failure to meet such standard constitutes negligence on the part of
the indemnity company).
88. See Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.Dallas 1985, no writ) (Stowers doctrine is inapplicable to cases involving only property insurance). The Texas Supreme Court has applied the tort of negligence to first party contractual
relationships outside the insurance context. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck,
146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947) (tort of negligence applicable for failure to
perform a service contract with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness).
89. Arnold v. National County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 178.
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ence between a contract covenant and a tort duty. 9 2 The supreme court has
refused explicitly to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all
contracts. 93 In a noninsurance context the court held that no implied cove94
nant exists for issues specifically dealt with by the terms of the contract.
Massey v. Armco Steel Co.95 first expressly raised the tort duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the context of insurance contracts. The dissent expressed the opinion that a tort action for a breach of a duty of good faith and
fair dealing exists in addition to a contract cause of action arising under the
policy of insurance. 96 Significantly, however, the majority neither rejected
nor accepted the tort duty of good faith and fair dealing. 9 7 The concurring
opinion in English v. Fischer9" also raised the tort duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 99 Justice Spears noted that the common thread in the cases adopting such a duty was a special relationship between the contracting parties. 100
Although the list of cases adopting such a duty included Stowers, 10 1 the justice failed to acknowledge or distinguish the fact that Stowers involved the
duty in a third party context, rather than a first party context.' 0 2 One federal district court case, Thompson v. M & B Construction Corp., 103 refused to
accept the idea that an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exists in
all contracts in Texas. 10 4 In reviewing Texas law, the Thompson court based
its conclusion on the fact that it did not anticipate that Texas courts would
adopt a good faith and fair dealing cause of action in the first party context. 10 5 Less than three years later, however, the Texas Supreme Court did
06
adopt that exact duty. 1
With the decision of Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. 107 the Texas Supreme Court adopted both the negligence standard of the
Stowers doctrine and the tort duty of good faith and fair dealing in the first
92. For an additional discussion on this distinction, see Comment, A New Tort for Texas:
Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1295, 1309-11 (1987)
(tort of bad faith blurs distinction between contract theory and tort law).
93. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983) (California policy contrary to
long-established adversary system of Texas).
94. See Exxon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1984) (a court
may not vary the terms of a contract with an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
While the Texas Supreme Court is reluctant to impose a covenant in contract causes, it is
willing to recognize an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947).
95. 635 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, rev'd on other grounds, 652
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1983) (case decided on another issue).
96. 635 S.W.2d at 599 (James, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 598. The majority contended that plaintiffs failed to allege a cause of action
based on this tort duty. Id.; see Longley, supra note 69, at D-21.
98. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
99. Id. at 524 (Spears, J., concurring).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. For a discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
585 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
Id. at 563.
Id.
Arnold v. National County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
Id.
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party context.' 0 8 Breach of this duty may result in the plaintiff's extra-contractual recovery of both exemplary and mental anguish damages. 10 9 Due to
the court's failure to explain the rationale supporting its decision, the previous uncertainty has merely multiplied. The court based its adoption of this

tort action on the special relationship that exists between the insurer and
insured.' I° Similar to Justice Spears's concurrence in English v. Fischer,I I I
the court's opinion failed to recognize that courts have previously only applied this special relationship rationale in the third party context in the area
of insurance.11 2 Upon analyzing the development of a similar first party
cause of action in California,' 13 the undeniable ramifications of such a move
by the judiciary, and the abundance of alternative remedies available, 1"4 the
author respectfully submits that the Texas Supreme Court should reevaluate
this drastic decision.
2.

Statutory Remedies

In contrast to the disparity among the courts on the available common
law causes of action, the statutory actions available to insureds to recover
extra-contractual remedies from their insurers are relatively clear. As previously mentioned, the three statutory sources of relief in Texas for a person
aggrieved by an insurance company are the DTPA, article 21.21, and the
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act. 1 5 The DTPA and article 21.21
clearly provide a private cause of action to an aggrieved insured. 1 6 The
courts of appeals addressing the issue of a private cause of action under the
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, however, has held that no such action exists.' 17
The DTPA provides a statutory source of relief in the first party context.
108. Id. The proposed elements of the cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing are:
(1) a contract between the insurer and the insured; (2) the insurer denied the
insured's claim or delayed in payment; and (3) (a) the insurer knew that it had
no reasonable basis for denying the claim or delaying in payments or (b) the
insurer failed to determine whether there was any reasonable basis for the denial
or delay.
Id. at 168 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 167. The court reasoned that this special relationship resulted from: (1) the
parties' unequal bargaining power; (2) the insurer's lack of incentive to settle claims if the only
penalty for such conduct is payment of interest on the amount owed; and (3) the insurer's
exclusive control of the claims process. Id.
111. 660 S.W.2d at 521. The court in Arnold cited Justice Spears's concurrence in Fischer.
Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
112. See Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved) (insurance company must make a good faith effort to settle with
third party claimant within insured's policy limits). For a discussion of the distinction between the first and third party context, see infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 222-53 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
116. DTPA § 17.50(a); Article 21.21, § 16.
117. McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Texas
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no
writ); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
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In contrast to article 21.21, which provides relief to "any person," only a
consumer may maintain an action under the DTPA. " 8 The DTPA includes
in the definition of consumer an individual who acquires any services." 9
This definition of consumer includes insureds. 120 Although an insured
clearly possesses a cause of action for the insurer's pre-sale conduct,' 2' a
dispute exists as to whether an insured has a cause of action for the post-sale
conduct of an insurer. 122 The weight of authority suggests no such cause of
23
action exists. 1
In the context of an insurer's pre-sale conduct, four basic causes of action
exist under the DTPA.' 24 The first, and most common, cause of action
arises from a violation of any of the unlawful deceptive trade practices enumerated in the "laundry list" of section 17.46.125 The second is a breach of
an express or implied warranty. 126 The third cause of action results from
any unconscionable action.' 2 7 If the insurer knowingly commits the unconscionable acts, a successful plaintiff may recover an extra-contractual award
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Russell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. DTPA § 17.50.
119. Id. § 17.45(4). Texas courts have established that an insurer provides a "service" as
defined by DTPA § 17.45(2) when the insurer issues an insurance policy. See McNeill v. McDavid Ins. Agency, 594 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14
Dist.] 1979, no writ).
120. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 603 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ) (an
insured is a consumer under the DTPA when he purchases a liability insurance policy).
121. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
122. See Jay Freeman Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 140, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(post-sale conduct of an insurer is not conduct occurring in connection with the purchase of
goods or services); Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail, 695 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (no private cause of action exists under DTPA for post-sale conduct of insurer investigating an alleged arson under a fire insurance policy); Rosell v. Farmers
Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (conduct of an insurer occurring after the purchase and delivery of an insurance policy cannot form
the basis of a cause of action under DTPA). But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d
595, 603 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ) (specifically rejected Rosell as clearly erroneous in
allowing insured to assert a cause of action under DTPA for post-sale conduct of insurer).
123. Of the four above cited courts addressing the issue, three hold that an insurer's postsale conduct cannot give rise to a DTPA cause of action. Jay Freeman Co., 486 F. Supp. at
142; Vail, 695 S.W.2d at 694; Rosell, 642 S.W.2d at 279.
124. DTPA § 17.50 (relief for consumers).
125. Id. § 17.50(a)(1). The most pertinent laundry list violations of § 17.46 to this article
are: "(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations
which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law; . . . (23) the failure to
disclose information .. " Id. § 17.46; see McNeill v. McDavid Ins. Agency, 594 S.W.2d 198,
203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ). The plaintiff brought an action under
DTPA § 17.46(b)(2), which imposes liability for failure to disclose information about services
with the intent to induce a consumer into a transaction. The court held that the agent's mere
failure to explain was not a deceptive act since the soliciting agent acted as an agent of the
insurer and not the insured. McNeill, 594 S.W.2d at 203.
126. DTPA § 17.50(a)(2).
127. Id. § 17.50(a)(3). Id. § 17.45(5) defines "unconscionable" as an act or practice that
either "takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of a person to
a grossly unfair degree" or "results in a gross disparity between the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration."
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in the form of punitive damages. 128 Finally, a cause of action arises under
the DTPA for any violation of article 21.21.129
In the event an insured is successful in presenting any of the above causes,
the DTPA provides extra-contractual remedies. Such remedies may include
treble damages,130 injunctive relief, 13 1 court orders restoring property, 32 actual damages,' 33 and attorney's fees. 134 Although treble damages are appropriate for a violation of the DTPA, a plaintiff may not recover both
exemplary and treble damages based on the same conduct of the insurer
since such an award would improperly award double recovery of punitive
35
damages. '
In addition to the DTPA cause of action, the insured possesses a private
cause of action under article 21.21. An insured clearly meets the definition
of "person" to qualify for standing under article 21.21.136 As in the third
party context, insureds prefer article 21.21 provisions over the DTPA in the
first party context. 137 Under article 21.21, section 16(b)(1), treble damages
mandatorily arise if the insurer "knowingly" committed such actions.' 3 8 In
contrast, treble damages are discretionary under the DTPA. 139 The only
128. See Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1984). The
plaintiff sued under DTPA, alleging damages for mental anguish and loss of use of an automobile. The Texas Supreme Court held that since gross negligence is sufficient to support mental
anguish damages at common law and since "knowing" standard exceeds gross negligence standard, plaintiff may recover damages for mental anguish. Id. at 117-18. But see United Travelers Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 611 S.W.2d 152, 156-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(the plaintiff could not recover under § 17.50 on an unconscionability theory, even though the
trial court found the insurer guilty of unconscionable conduct, since the insurer never actually
issued the policy).
129. DTPA § 17.50(a)(4).

130. Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
131. Id. § 17.50(b)(2).
132. Id. § 17.50(b)(3).
133. Id. § 17.50(b)(l). Compare Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Stice, 640 S.W.2d 955,
959-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (since insured received the policy proceeds
in a suit against her insurer, the insurer's denial of liability resulted in no actual damages) with
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 604 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(court rejected as meritless the insurer's argument that if the insured recovers actual damages
in the form of the excess judgment, then the insured may not recover treble damages).
134. DTPA § 17.50(d).
135. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 606 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Butler v. Joseph's Wine Shop, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Charlie Thomas Courtesy Ford v. Avalos, 619 S.W.2d 9, 11
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); DTPA § 17.43.
136. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. A suit under article 21.21 appears more
advantageous than under the DTPA since the former imposes a less restrictive standing requirement. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
137. See Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-17. Although significant differences arise
between the DTPA and article 21.21, similarities also exist. For example, both DTPA and
article 21.21 require a thirty-day presuit notice. DTPA § 17.50A; article 21.21, § 16(c)-(i).
They both provide a two-year statute of limitations. DTPA § 17.50A; article 21.21, § 16(d).
The insurer's cause of action for a groundless claim is the same under both statutes. DTPA
§ 17.50B; article 21.21, § 16(c). Also, similar to the DTPA, a denial of coverage does not give
rise to liability under any of the article 21.21 causes of action. See General Accident, Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Legate, 578 S.W.2d 505, 506-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. Article 21.21, § 16(b)(1); see Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-2.
139. DTPA § 17.50(b); see Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-17.
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action provided for under the DTPA that is unavailable under40article 21.21,
section 16 is one for unconscionable conduct by the insurer.'
The third statutory source of relief arises from article 21.21-2, commonly
referred to as the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act.1 41 The State
Board of Insurance enforces this statute.14 2 Unlike the previously discussed
statutory provisions, Texas courts have debated the issue43of whether article
21.21-2 confers a private cause of action to individuals.
Article 21.21-2 provides that no insurer shall engage in unfair claim settlement practices.' At least two Texas appellate courts were of the opinion
that this article does not grant a private cause of action to an individual
injured by those unfair claim practices.1 45 In both of these cases the complainants attempted to bring private actions under the provisions of article
21.21-2. Although the courts in these cases held that no private cause existed, the courts did not address whether the absence of a private cause of
action under article 21.21-2 foreclosed any action for these unfair claim
practices under either the DTPA or article 21.21.146
Dictum in Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds 147 addressed the question of
the availability of an article 21.21-2 cause of action under either the DTPA
or article 21.21. The Amarillo court of appeals, in interpreting article 21.212, stated that the legislature did not intend the statute to foreclose a private
cause of action for bad faith settlement practices for acts that a court may
hold as unfair or deceptive outside the provision of the act.1 48 In other
words, this court would appear to allow the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act and its prohibited provisions to constitute the basis of a private
cause of action should the insured properly allege damages under article
21.21 or the DTPA. The federal district court for the Northern District of
Texas, however, reached a contrary result.1 49 That court held that only the
State Board of Insurance may enforce the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
Act.150 The court further held that an insured cannot sue an insurer under
140. DTPA § 17.50(a)(3); see Longley & Maxwell, supra note 69, at D-17.
141.

Article 21.21-2.

142. Id. §§ 2, 6(a).
143. See McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (no

private cause of action exists under article 21.21-2); Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vail,
695 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (no private cause of action under
either article 21.21-2 or DTPA for unfair claim settlement practices); Humphreys v. Fort
Worth Lloyds, 617 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (legislature did

not intend article 21.21-2 to foreclose a private cause of action if pleaded through article 21.21
or the DTPA); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no private cause of action under article 21.21-2); Russell v.
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (no private cause of action exists under article 21.21-2).
144. Article 21.21-2, § 2.

145. See Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Russell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

146. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
147. 617 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
148. Id. at 790.

149. McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
150. Id. at 364.
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section 17.50 of the DTPA for violations of article 21.21-2.15 This latter
position is the more persuasive in interpreting the legislative intent behind
article 21.21-2.
III.

EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA:

A

CONTRASTING VIEW

Unlike the reluctance appearing in the Texas courts, the California courts
have aggressively extended extra-contractual liability in both the third and
first party contexts. Since California led the way to the imposition of extracontractual liability, that state's policies and results can assist Texas courts
in their analysis of whether to extend further the insurer's liability. Upon
evaluation of the California system, however, this Comment concludes that
Texas should not adopt California's liberal standard.
A.
1.

Third Party Context

Common Law Remedies

As in Texas, the development of extra-contractual remedies began in California in third party cases. In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
Co. 152 the California Supreme Court recognized the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in third party insurance contract cases.1 53 The court read into
the contract an implied covenant that neither party would engage in conduct
that would injure the right of the other to receive the policy benefits. 154 The
court held that within the context of the contractual relationship of the parties to an insurance contract, a court can compel the insurer to ignore its
55
own best interest in favor of the insured's best interest.
The California Supreme Court expanded Comunale in Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co. 156 The court in Crisci held that an insurer stands liable for
the full amount of any subsequent judgment whenever the insurer refuses to
accept an offer within policy limits. 157 The basis for the adoption of this
duty of good faith dealings in third party situations is that a fiduciary relationship exists between the insurer and the insured arising out of the insurer's exclusive control over the settlement negotiations. 158
151. Id. at 364-65.
152. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
153. 328 P.2d at 200-01. The court ignored the insurer's defense of no coverage and held
that whenever a claimant makes a settlement demand within policy limits, the courts will
impose a duty to settle or defend the insured. Id.
154. Id. at 200.
155. Id. at 201.
156. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).

157. 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18; see Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 746-48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290-92 (1975) (trend
toward strict liability on part of insurer that rejects an offer to settle within policy limits in a
case of major damages).
158. See Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 48, 324 A.2d 906, 908 (1974); see
also Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974) (a
fiduciary relationship exists with respect to third party liability insurers at least with respect to
that part of the relationship requiring it to defend claims on behalf of its insured).
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2. Statutory Remedies
In addition to the case law expansion of extra-contractual liability in the
third party situations developed above, California statutes provide penalties
in the event of violations. Like Texas's article 21.21-2, California has a statutory provision that regulates unfair claim practices of insurers. 1 9 Also
similar to Texas law, the California statute provides for the state's Insurance
Commission to enforce its provisions.' 60 Unlike the Texas courts, however,
the California Supreme Court has further held that a court may imply a
third party private6 1 cause of action from the provisions of the unfair claim
practices statute.'
In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court 162 the plaintiff incurred
personal injuries when she slipped and fell in a food market. The plaintiff
sued the liability insurer of the market for violating the unfair claims settlement provisions of the Insurance Code 16 3 by failing to settle promptly and
by advising the plaintiff not to retain an attorney. The California Supreme
Court expressly held that a violation of the unfair claims settlement practices
provisions of the California Insurance Code gave rise to a private cause of
action for money damages and that such a cause of action extends to third
party claimants. 164 The third party may not bring suit against the insurer,
however, until the third party and the insured conclude any suit between
65
them. 1
B.

First Party Context

1. Common Law Remedies
In addition to the expansion of extra-contractual liability in third party
situations, the California courts have laid the foundation for its extension to
first party situations. These courts first extended extra-contractual liability
under the tort theories of fraud, 166 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 16 7 breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,' 68 and
interference with a property interest.169 Eventually, however, the California
Supreme Court adopted a tort theory of bad faith to allow insureds to re159. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972).
160. Id. at § 790.05.
161. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. 3d 880, 885, 592 P.2d 329, 332, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 845 (1979).
162. Id.
163. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5), (14) (West Supp. 1987).
164. 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
165. Id.
166. See Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764, 769 (1968)
(insurer's conduct after entering the contract and failure to settle the claim sustained an infer-

ence of fraudulent intent).
167. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 93-94 (1970) (insured's recovery for emotional distress justified based on insurer's attempt

to economically coerce insured to settle for less than fair amount).
168. See id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rtpr. at 93 (breach results from insurer's threatened or actual
withholding of payments without probable cause).
169. See id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (insured's right to policy proceeds constitutes
a protected property interest).
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cover extra-contractual damages.1 7 1
The California Supreme Court established the concept of the bad faith tort
in first party insurance situations in Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co. 171 In
adopting the tort of bad faith in the first party context, the court reasoned
that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every insurance contract.' 72 Such a duty exists whether third persons bring the claim
against the insured or the insured itself makes the claim.' 73 The court concluded that an insurer is liable in tort if the insurer unreasonably and in bad
faith withholds payment of its insured's claim.' 74 The court added that the
existence of a contractual relationship does not insulate the insurers from
liability.' 75 Although the Gruenberg court made an impact on extra-con-

tractual damages in the context of property insurance policies, it left unanswered the issue of when insurers' conduct would support an award for
punitive damages.
Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co. 176 dealt with the question of the
77
Siltype of conduct necessary to support an award of punitive damages.'
berg held that in order to have a punitive damage claim, the insured must
prove more than just bad faith.' 78 The insured must additionally prove the
insurer guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.' 79 In addition to setting the
standard for punitive damages, the Silberg decision appears significant in
four aspects. First, the court established that an insurer may face liability

based upon action or inaction.' 80 Second, the court held the insurer to a
higher standard of conduct than the ordinary negligence standard.' 8' Third,
evidence of customs of the insurance industry is not conclusive on the scope
of the insurer's duty.' 8 2 Finally,
the bad faith tort does not require the in8 3
surer's intentional conduct.
Several jurisdictions have adopted the California tort of bad faith in first
party actions.' 8 4 The following policy considerations support this duty of
170. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 486 (1973).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.

173. Id.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
Id. at 462-63, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.

178. Id.
179. Id.; Fanning, Bad Faith & Other Extra-ContractualActions Against Insurers, FOR
THE DEF., Nov. 1985, at 11, 14.
180. 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717; see also Fanning, supra note
179, at 14 (mere refusal to pay without adequate grounds is sufficient to constitute liability).
181. 11 Cal. 2d at 460, 521 P.2d at 1108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. The insurer's good faith
duty includes paying at least as much attention to the insured's interest as it pays to its own
interest. Id.
182. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
183. Fanning, supra note 179, at 14.
184. See United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974); Findley v.
Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908, 909 (1978); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v.
Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Super. Ct. 1977); Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McClain, 243 Ga. 263, 253 S.E.2d 745, 756 (1979); Vernon Fire &
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good faith and fair dealing: (1) unequal bargaining power; 18 5 (2) intent of
insurance is not private economic gain of insurer, but economic security in
case of loss to insured; 186 (3) bad faith refusal to pay policy benefits often has
disastrous effects on the insured;18 7 (4) insurance policies may be contracts
of adhesion;18 8 (5) such a duty will punish insurers for breach and deter
others from future violations;' 8 9 and (6) a fiduciary duty exists between insurer and insured in a first party insurance claim based on an implied covenant of fair dealing that exists in every contract.1 90 Although the courts
accepting the tort of bad faith in first party actions justify their actions based
on a national trend, further research reveals that this trend does not exist. 91
2. Statutory Remedies

Although an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing clearly protects the insured in California,1 92 a first party statutory cause of action is
available as a supplement to existing common law remedies. 193 The California Supreme Court has extended its holding in Royal Globe to apply in the
first party context so that insureds have a private cause of action under the
unfair claim settlement practice provisions of the California Insurance
Code. 194 Thus, while the Texas courts currently debate the first party private cause of action,' 95 the California courts allow such a cause of action.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT

Those jurisdictions that choose to follow California argue that the national trend urges the adoption of bad faith and its accompanying extracontractual liability in first party cases.1 96 In actuality, however, the more
recent and growing trend arises among those jurisdictions specifically reCasualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976); First Sec. Bank v.
Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins.
Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D. 1979); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 57
Ohio St. 2d 49, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1970); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577
P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1978).
185. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1978).
186. See Comment, supra note 4, at 141.
187. Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375
A.2d 428, 430 (Super. Ct. 1977).
188. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1978).
189. See Comment, supra note 4, at 141.
190. Polito v. Continental Casualty Co., 689 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir. 1982).
191. See infra notes 197 and 222 and accompanying text.
192. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93
(1970).
193. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION
§ 6.04(2)(a) (1984).
194. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647 P.2d 86, 70, 183
Cal. Rptr. 810, 813-14 (1982).
195. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (eleven jurisdictions have adopted the first
party cause of action; all in the 1970s).
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jecting the tort of bad faith in the first party context. 197 What the current
law is and where it is going in the area of insurers' extra-contractual liability
in both the first and third party context concerns Texas. Although the Stowers doctrine established extra-contractual liability of the insurer to its insured in the third party context, uncertainties exist in all other areas. As the
following discussion illustrates, it is essential that the Texas Supreme Court
not extend this liability to third party claimants and that the court reexamine its extension to insureds in the first party context.
A.

Limit Extra-ContractualLiability to Third Party Stowers Context and
Specific Statutory Situations

To date, the Texas Supreme Court has refused to extend insurer's extracontractual liability to the liberal extremes of the California courts. Texas
courts adhere to the Stowers doctrine wherein the insured must prove the
insurer negligent in refusing to settle a tort claim within the policy limits in
order to recover a judgment in excess of such limits. 198 Although the Texas
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of an insurer's liability to the
third party claimant, the court has refused writ for cases involving the question as containing no reversible error. 199 The courts should maintain the
position that the Stowers doctrine does not apply to the third party claimant. 2°° This third party direct action appears unnecessary since the claimant
benefits from the insurer's neglect to the extent of the harm caused to the
insured. 20 ' The insured suffers the excess judgment, not the third party
claimant. 20 2 The insured, therefore, possesses any cause of action that may
exist against the insurer.
In addition to the common law context, a third party should not possess a
statutory cause of action against an insurer. No Texas case has extended a
statutory cause of action to a third party claimant. When presented with the
the California posiopportunity, the Texas Supreme Court should not adopt
20 3
tion of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.
The position of the California Supreme Court in Royal Globe appears both
irrational and destructive of the public policy that forms the basis of the
Model Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act,2°4 which both California and
Texas follow. The Texas Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act sets out, as
197. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (ten jurisdictions addressing the issue have
specifically rejected the first party cause of action; this move made by all but one since 1980).
198. See Knox, supra note 27, at 67.

199. See Samford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. Samford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d at 86; Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d

at 364.
201. Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d at 364.
202. Samford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d at 86.
203. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979); see supra notes 162-65 and
accompanying text.

204.
CEPTIVE

AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DEACTS AND PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.

Comm'rs 1972); see Ryan, supra note 1, at 24.
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do both the California 20 5 and Model Acts, unfair claim practices that are
violative when performed so frequently as to indicate a requisite general
business practice. 20 6 The third party claimant's claimed right to direct action against the insurer evolves from the insurer's failure to attempt "in good
faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted
in which liability has become reasonably clear."' 20 7 In extending this provision to third party claimants, California effectively has destroyed the public
policy of regulating only those acts that the insurer performs with frequency. 20 8 A single alleged violation by an insurer does not constitute a
general business practice.
In allowing a third party cause of action under the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, California has adopted the attitude that the insurer must
make settlements with claimants without regard to the social costs of such a
position. 20 9 The social cost of this statutory interpretation equals the elimination of the trial court process to resolve such issues. By compelling the
insurer into compromise settlements, the insurer's fair access to a jury trial
2 10
becomes unprotected.
The Texas courts should enforce this same general business practice rationale in statutory actions brought by insureds against their insurers. As in
the third party context, insurer conduct solely with respect to the particular
insured's claim should not give rise to a cause of action under the Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices Act. 2 11 The Texas courts do not dispute the issue that an insured cannot sue its insurer under the Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices Act. 2 12 A dispute does exist, however, on the issue of whether an
insured can sue under the DTPA for violations of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act. 2 13 The DTPA expressly provides a cause of action to an
insured for any violation of article 21.21. 2 14 Had the legislature intended a
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1987); see Ryan, supra note 1, at 24.
Article 21.21-2, § 2.
Id. § 2(d).
See Ryan, supra note 1, at 25.
Id.

210. Id. at 25-26.
211. See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489, 464
N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (1983).
212. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds, 617 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1981, no writ) (legislature prohibiting private cause of action under article 21.21-2
not intended to foreclose private action if plead through article 21.21 or DTPA); Lone Star
Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (no private cause of action under article 21.21-2); Russell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.,
548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no private cause of
action under article 21.21-2).
213. Compare McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(no private cause of action under article 21.21-2) and Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574
S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (article 21.21-2 does
not confer a private cause of action) with Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds, 617 S.W.2d 788,
790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (legislature did not intend article 21.21-2 to
foreclose a private cause of action if pleaded through article 21.21 or the DTPA).
214. DTPA § 17.50(a)(4). A consumer may maintain a private action when the insurer's
violation of article 21.21, or its rules or regulations issued by the State Board of Insurance,
constitutes a producing cause of actual damages. Id.
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private cause of action for violations of article 21.21-2, the Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act, the legislature would have included this provision
among the DTPA causes of action. Instead, only the State Insurance Department may enforce the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act. 2' 5 Since
the early 1970s the Texas Legislature has demonstrated a marked interest in
statutorily governing the relationship between the insurer and insured. 21 6
The judiciary should not read into these statutes additional, unnecessary
regulations.
B.

Retreatfrom the UnwarrantedExtension of Extra-Contractual
Liability in the FirstParty Context

Clearly, the insurer's obligation to accept a good faith settlement within
the policy limits represents the law in Texas in the third party context. 21 7
The obligation of good faith settlements in first party actions, however, has
been quite controversial. 218 California has extended the duty of good faith
and fair dealing that existed in third party claims to the first party context.2 19 The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed the important question of whether to reject a first party bad faith tort since no case existed that
approved such a cause of action in Texas or, in view of the lack of clear
prohibition against such claims in Texas, whether the court should adopt
such a tort action. 220 Unfortunately, in electing to adopt a first party cause
of action for breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court offered
little justification for its conclusion. 22' At its first opportunity, the court
should give serious consideration to overruling this decision.
The recent and growing trend is among those jurisdictions specifically rejecting the tort of bad faith and the accompanying extra-contractual liability
in the first party context. 222 These jurisdictions base their decisions on more
persuasive policy grounds and traditional concepts of contract, tort, and
statutory liability. Examples of policy justifications for refusing to adopt ex215. See McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 364 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Article
21.21-2, § 6.
216. The Texas Legislature enacted both the DTPA and article 21.21, § 16 in 1973. See

Comment, supra note 28, at 456.
217. See supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
219. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr.

480, 486 (1973); see supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
220. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
221. Id.

222. See Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 So. 2d 361, 368-69 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982);
Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 232 Kan. 76, 652 P.2d 665,
668 (1982); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 158
(1980); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (1980);

Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652-53
(Minn. 1979); Duncan v. Andrew County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mut. Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 716, 723-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 122 N.H. 648, 448 A.2d 407, 409 (1982); Milcarek v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 358, 463 A.2d 950, 957 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983);

Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-21 (1978);

D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966, 969-70
(1981); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985).
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tra-contractual liability in the first party context include: (1) general rules of
contract law disallow punitive damages; 223 (2) other means of recovery are
unnecessary based on the favorable rules of construction already granted insureds by case law; 224 (3) judicial intervention is unnecessary since statutes
provide insureds with necessary protection; 225 (4) the rationale supporting
extra-contractual liability in third party situations does not apply in the first
party context; 2 26 and (5) public policy does not support compelling settlements and discouraging insurers from challenging claims that appear fairly
2 27
debatable.
The most obvious of these justifications for rejecting the imposition of liability upon an insurer in excess of policy limits in an action brought by one
of its insureds is found in traditional contract law. Prior to the Gruenberg
wave, Hadley v. Baxendale22 8 and the historic concept of limited recovery
under a contract governed insurers' liability. 229 From Hadley American
courts logically reasoned that an action for breach of an insurance contract
was limited to the policy amount. 230 Such a limitation encompassed the
foreseeable damages within the contemplation of the parties at the time the
parties executed the contract. 23 1 These contractual damages for breach of
23 2
an insurance contract do not include mental anguish or punitive damages.
The arguments that the insured and insurer have unequal bargaining
power, 233 or that the insurance policy is a contract of adhesion, 234 possess no
merit. First, the courts have firmly established that they will interpret any
contract ambiguities in favor of the insured. 235 Second, the State Insurance
Board strictly regulates and controls the insurance industry in Texas. 236
The truth of the matter is that neither the insured nor the insurer controls
the terms of the contract.
The involvement of the State Insurance Board coupled with intense legislative regulation of insurers make judicial intervention unnecessary and inappropriate in protecting insureds. Texas has enacted statutory penalties
against insurance companies that fail, without good cause, to settle claims
223. Comment, supra note 4, at 142.
224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 155 (1980).
227. Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad Faith: Common-Law Remedies and a Proposed
Legislative Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141, 190 (1983-84).

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
See Miller, supra note 3, at 3.
See id.
See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 158

(1980).
233. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1978).
234. Id.
235. See Ramsey v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1976); Royal
Indem. Co. v. Marshall, 388 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex. 1965); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Spillars, 368 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. 1963).

236. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. App.Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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with their insureds. 237 These legislative remedies should be exclusive,
238
thereby eliminating the need for other remedies.
Traditional rules applicable to contract and statutory law provide the
most obvious justifications for reevaluating the extension of extra-contractual liability in the first party context. A less obvious, but more widely debated, justification is that the rationale behind the widely accepted excess
liability in a third party situation does not apply to a first party situation. 239
Courts can easily distinguish the rationale for the duty and imposition of
liability in the third party case from an insurer's duty in the first party situation. In the third party context, the insurer possesses absolute control of
settlement negotiations and the trial. 240 This control of the insurer over the
liability of the insured creates a fiduciary relationship between the insurer
and the insured. 24 1 In the first party context, the duties and obligations of
the parties arise from a contract rather than a fiduciary relationship. 242 As
in all contracts, an adversarial relationship exists between the insurer and
the insured. 24 3 In this context, the insurer could not expose its insured to a
judgment that is greater than the limits specified in the policy. 24 4 The

supreme court invites great danger in allowing first party extra-contractual
liability. The insured has the opportunity to transform a simple first party
claim into a broad-ranging and costly inquiry into the general business practices of the insurer. The high risk and tremendous cost of defending may
discourage the insurer from asserting a legitimate defense. 245 This possibility runs counter to Texas's long-established adversarial system. 246
The adversary system evokes the final criticism of extra-contractual damages in the first party context. The threat of excess liability, in the form of
punitive damages, may inhibit insurers from asserting appropriate defenses 24 7 and ultimately lead to payments under normally uninsurable situations. 248 The fear of such judgments should not be so great that it
discourages insurers from challenging at least "fairly debatable" claims. 249
237. See supra notes 75 and 130-34 and accompanying text.
238. See Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 11. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373, 378 (1978)
(courts harbor serious doubts as to the desirability and wisdom of implementing or expanding
a legislative remedy by judicial decree); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan.
914, 611 P.2d 149, 158 (1980) (when a legislature has provided effective remedies, the courts
should not expand them by judicial decree); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty
Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966, 969-70 (1981) (state insurance departments and state
legislatures are able to prohibit unfair claim practices).
239. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 155 (1980).
240. Id.

241. Id.
242. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).
243. Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 155 (1980).
244. Id.; Lawton v. Great Southwestern Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576, 581
(1978).
245. Murray & Maillet, Extra-Contractual Remedies & Punitive Damages in First-Party
Insurance Claims, 53 INS. COUNS. J., Apr. 1986, at 251, 252.
246. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
247. For a discussion on available defenses, see infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
248. See Miller, supra note 3, at 2.
249. Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 212, at 190. Examples of cases with fairly debatable
claims include: Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 94 I11.App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d
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250
The insurer does not, and should not, have to pay every claim submitted.
The insurer's obligation demands that it pay valid claims within a reasonable
time. 2 5' When a claim is fairly debatable, the adversary system should encourage the insurer to debate it, regardless of whether the issue is one of fact
or law. 252 Such debate encourages respect for the principle of the adversary
system that injury, regardless of severity, is "never enough" and "victory is
'253
never certain.

C. Recognize Defenses and Precautions
While the present judicial climate remains unpredictable, the justifications
for reevaluating the recent expansion and rejecting any further expansion of
extra-contractual liability in Texas appear abundant. In the event the insurer is faced with a bad faith allegation while the Texas courts remain in
254
this unsettled state, the insurer may avail himself of several defenses.
Among those defenses is an insurer's "comparative bad faith" defense. This
defense arises when the insured fails to provide the insurer promptly with
full and complete information pertinent to the claim. 255 An insurer who has
scrutinized its claims handling procedures and fulfilled all its policy obligations should assert an available defense and not withdraw from the civil
25 6
challenge.
421, 427 (1981) (when fire department officials told insurer a fire was deliberately set, the
insurer did not act in bad faith in contesting the claim); Pruitt v. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co.,
28 Wash. App. 802, 626 P.2d 528, 530 (1981) (bona fide dispute over the existence and extent
of old versus new damage).
250. LePley, Bad Faith Updated: Definitions & Defenses, TRIAL, Apr. 1985, at 44, 48.
251. Id. An insurer does not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing when it denies a
claim that is fairly debatable. Id.; see Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 924
(Ala. 1981).
252. Gulf At. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981).
253. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 26.
254. The insurer's available defenses include:
(1)The insurer believes that it has a fighting chance to defeat the claim or of
holding the amount of the judgment within the policy limits.
(2) The insurer makes a mere mistake of judgment.
(3) The insured refuses to give the insurer the true facts.
(4) The insurer suspects collusion on the part of the insured.
(5) The insured is guilty of misconduct.
(6) The insured joins the insurer in rejecting any compromise offer.
(7) The insurer possesses a contractual right to appeal.
(8) The insured's claimant's mental condition prohibits the insured from consenting to a settlement.
(9) There is a breach of the cooperation clause.
(10) There is no settlement opportunity within policy limits.
Berg, supra note 13, at D-12. If the insurer tenders damages and attorney's fees within thirty
days from the date of notice of the DTPA complaint, the insurer possesses a defense under the
DTPA. See DTPA § 17.50B(d). Moreover, an insurer may recover attorney's fees for a
groundless suit under the DTPA. See Genico Distribs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 616 S.W.2d
418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Smith v. Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1981) (no common law defenses are available to a DTPA claim; only
those defenses provided by statute).
255. California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283,
218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822-23 (1985).
256. See Miller, supra note 3, at 2.
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Although the insurer has many available defenses, the insurer obviously
prefers to avoid any bad faith allegation. Insurers and their defense counsel
should be aware of the threat of extra-contractual liability and take every
precaution to avoid potential excess liability situations. In both the first and
third party context, these precautions include: (1) the prompt and thorough
investigation of losses; 257 (2) a fair evaluation of the claim's value; 258 (3) informing the insured about the investigation; 259 (4) providing complete, accurate, and timely responses to inquiries; 26° and (5) refraining from saying or
doing things that courts may classify as tortious or unfair. 26' Additionally,
in the third party context, the insurer should take care in deciding whether
26 2
to defend the insured.
V.

CONCLUSION

The climate in Texas remains unstable in the area of insurers' extra-contractual liability. Questions exist as to the availability of a third party direct
cause of action against the insurer for common law and statutory extra-contractual remedies. An equally turbulent debate exists on when an insured
may recover extra-contractual remedies from its insurer in the first party
context. The Texas Supreme Court should encourage the continued success
263
of the adversarial system that has proven effective for the past 150 years.
The court's upholding of the contractual foundation that supports the relationship between the insurer and the insured will continue the success of the
adversarial system. In the first party context, courts should limit damages to
those that the parties reasonably anticipated when they entered into the
agreement. In the third party context, the court should uphold traditional
contract theory and forbid third party claimants, who are outside the contractual relationship, from pursuing an action against the insurer. The
Texas Legislature extensively regulates the insurance industry. Since such
regulations provide the public with the necessary protection, the judiciary
should not interfere. The Texas Supreme Court should refuse to expand
extra-contractual liability in the third party context. The court should also
reevaluate its decision in Arnold and follow the growing trend that limits
insurers' liability to the policy terms in the first party context.

257. See Berg, supra note 13, at D-1 1.
258. Id.
259. Id. at D-12.
260. See Ashley, Guidelinesfor the Insurer in Avoiding Bad Faith Exposure, 36 FED'N OF
INS. & CORP. COUN. Q 103, 106 (1986).
261. Id. at 107.
262. Id. at 103.
263. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).

